Laura W Caldwell, personally, and Nelda F Wall on behalf of the Estate of Hal E. Wall v. Steven D. Caldwell : Petition for Rehearing by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1997
Laura W Caldwell, personally, and Nelda F Wall on
behalf of the Estate of Hal E. Wall v. Steven D.
Caldwell : Petition for Rehearing
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Stephen G. Homer; Attorney for Appellant.
Delano S. Findlay; Attorneys for Appellees.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Caldwell v. Caldwell, No. 970239 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/823
UTAH CO-
8RMEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS50 
^ U w a - S E Z 2 3 ^ 
LAUREL W CALDWELL, 
personally, and NELDA 
F WALL on behalf of 
the Estate of HAL E. 
WALL, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees 
vs 
STEVEN D CALDWELL, 
Defendant-Appellant 
Court of Appeals 
Docket No. 970239-CA 
Argument Priority 15 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court 
The Honorable Frank G Noel, District Judge 
STEPHEN G HOMER 
Attorney at Law 
9225 South Redwood Road 
West Jordan, Utah 84088 
Attorney for Appellant 
STEVEN D CALDWELL 
DELANO S FINDLAY 
Attorney at Law 
923 East 5350 South, Suite E 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Attorney for Appellees 
LAUREL W CALDWELL and NELDA F WALL 
FILED 
FEB 2 5 1998 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LAUREL W CALDWELL, 
personally, and NELDA 
F WALL on behalf of 
the Estate of HAL E. 
WALL, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees 
vs 
STEVEN D CALDWELL, 
Defendant-Appellant 
APPELLANT'S 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Court of Appeals 
Docket No. 970239-CA 
The Defendant-Appellant STEVEN D CALDWELL submits 
the following APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 2 
PETITION FOR REHEARING ARGUMENT 2 
I 
INVALID SERVICE OF PROCESS 
RENDERS THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT VOID 
A 
THE COURT'S DECISION MISAPPLIES 
THE HOLDINGS OF GRANT VS LAWRENCE 
AND REED VS REED 
B 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE COURT SHOULD REMAND 
THE CASE TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR A PROPER APPLICATION OF 
THE NEWLY-ANNOUNCED "PRESUMPTION" STANDARD 
II 
THE COURT'S DECISION IGNORES THE DEFENDANT'S 
ANALYSIS OF THE RULE 54(c)(2) VIOLATIONS AND ISSUES 
Ill 
THE COURT'S DECISION IGNORES THE ISSUES 
RAISED BY THE STEVENS VS COLLARD DECISION 
CONCLUSION 15 
CERTIFICATE 16 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Grant vs Lawrence, 
37 Utah 450, 108 Pac. 931 (1910) 2,3,5,6,7,8,9,15 
Reed vs Reed, 
806 P.2d 1182 (Utah Supreme Court 1991) 3,4,5,15 
Stevens vs Collard, 
837 P.2d 593 (Utah Court of Appeals 1992), 
modified 863 P.2d 534 (Utah Court of 
Appeals 1993) 12, 14, 15 
Court rules 
Rule 4, U.R.C.P 3, 6, 7, 15 
Rule 54, U.R.C.P. . 10,11,12,13,14,15 
PETITION FOR REHEARING ARGUMENT 
I 
INVALID SERVICE OF PROCESS 
RENDERS THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT VOID 
A 
THE COURT'S DECISION MISAPPLIES 
THE HOLDINGS OF GRANT VS LAWRENCE 
AND REED VS REED 
The Court's decision ignores the long-standing 
HOLDING of the Grant vs Lawrence, 37 Utah 450, 108 Pac. 
931 (1910) decision, by relying upon dicta (as to a 
"presumption" of law that a man's residence is where his 
2 
family lives) , inappropriately applied in only this case. 
The operative text of Rule 4 does not utilize the term 
"residence". It utilizes the term "usual place of abode": 
a term which Grant vs Lawrence has, for over eighty-five 
years, defined to be the place where the Defendant is 
living at the time the service is made. 
The Court's reliance upon Reed vs Reed, 8 06 P. 2d 
1182 (Utah Supreme Court 1991), as being dispositive to 
this case, is similarly misplaced. First, Reed vs Reed 
did not overrule Grant vs Lawrence, but supports it. 
Second, the trial court in Reed made extensive written 
findings of fact based upon an evidentiary hearing; in 
the instant case, no evidentiary hearing was held 
[because there were numerous other legal issues and 
because the Defendant's residence out of the state of 
Missouri had been previously acknowledged by Plaintiff's 
counsel! Thirdly, in Reed there was considerable evidence 
to show that the defendant was residing at the home of 
his parents who received service for him and who were co-
defendants in that litigation, of which litigation the 
defendant was made aware even before he was "served"! 
Fourthly, in Reed, there was presented to the trial court 
considerable evidence to affirmatively show that the 
defendant's actual residence was, in fact, with his 
parents and to rebut the Defendant's claim that he was 
3 
out of state; that conflicting evidence was resolved by 
the trial court against the Defendant, who actually 
presented no evidence. 
Lastly, in Reed the Utah Supreme Court, quoting a 
federal court decision stated: 
[N] o hard and fast rule can be fashioned to 
determine what is or is not a party's "dwelling 
house or usual place of abode" within the 
rule's meaning; rather the practicalities of 
the particular fact situation determine whether 
service meets the requirements of 4(d)(1). 
[T]he provision concerning usual place of 
abode should be [construed liberally] to 
effectuate service if actual notice has been 
received by the defendant and that in the last 
analysis the question of service must be 
resolved by "what best serves to give notice to 
a defendant that he is being served with 
process, considering the situation from a 
practical standpoint. 
806 P. 2d at . Bracketed material in original. 
Emphasis added. 
In the instant case, the Defendant's affidavit 
affirmatively states : 
3 . I did not receive a copy of the summons and 
complaint when I returned home to Appleton, 
Missouri, nor was I ever informed of the 
existence of the summons and complaint in this 
action. 
Emphasis added. Thus, under the language quoted from 
Reed, above, the Defendant never received "actual notice" 
of the instant action. 
The most cogent reason why the service was defective 
(in the context of defendant's motion to set aside the 
4 
default judgment) is discerned from a careful reading of 
the Reed decision. In Reed, the defendant ACTUALLY 
APPEARED AND HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO LITIGATE THE MERITS OF 
THE CASE, prior to the "default judgment" which was 
ultimately entered against him. This fact alone, but 
especially so when coupled with the extensive factual 
findings entered by the trial court, distinguish Reed 
from the case at bar! [While the Appellant herein is not 
necessarily arguing for a "dual standard" as what 
constitutes valid service, the opportunity afforded the 
defendant in Reed to actually litigate the merits of the 
case certainly goes a long way to say that the Appellant 
should be afforded that same opportunity!] 
The Court's decision ignores not only the operative 
holding of Grant vs Lawrence but also the numerous and 
thoroughly-analytical statements explaining that holding. 
It is incomprehensible that the Court would now be 
abandoning the time-honored standard, which is consistent 
with the wording of Rule 4, in favor of a "presumption". 
The issue here is not, per se, one of fact or proof. 
Rather, the issue is one of law. The Defendant has 
asserted that he was not residing in Appleton, Missouri 
at the time service was made; that he resided in Texas 
hundreds of miles away. [It's physically impossible to 
get off work, drive 600 miles to Missouri sleep 
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overnight and then drive 6 00 more miles back to Texas, 
to arrive at work at the begin of the next "work day". 
The Defendant certainly ought to be entitled to the 
reasonable inferences arising from the factual statements 
within his Affidavit.] The only rebuttal the Plaintiffs 
offered concerned the Defendant's attendance at a family 
picnic at the Appleton, Missouri address in May 1992 
over four months prior to the date of service. That the 
Defendant attended the picnic in May does not mean that 
he still resides there in September! 
Grant vs Lawrence is absolutely clear in its holding 
and the explanation for that holding: that "usual place 
of abode" is a much more narrow term than "residence" (or 
"legal residence") . Consequently, the Court's adoption of 
the "presumption" approach is flawed: flawed because it 
directly contradicts Grant vs Lawrence and flawed because 
it does not adhere to the terms of Rule 4. 
Furthermore, to allow the "presumption" to require 
the Defendant's to establish by affidavit or otherwise-
as to where he was (or wasn't) on a given date some 
three years earlier) is unrealistic and inappropriate, 
particularly in this case. That particular factual issue 
was not directly in dispute; Plaintiffs' counsel even 
before service was made acknowledged that the Defendant 
was in Appleton only on weekends. [Service was made on a 
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Monday.] Secondly, the Defendant himself has explained 
his work schedule: by any stretch of the imagination or 
any reasonable mathematical calculation, the Appleton 
residence was not his "usual place of abode", over the 
short-run period, even though Mr Caldwell's family lived 
there on a permanent basis. 
It is incumbent upon the Plaintiff, as the moving 
party in the litigation, to effect valid service of 
process. If valid service is not effected, then any 
judgment entered thereon particularly a default 
judgment is void. The Plaintiff waited until literally 
the "last minute" the absolute "last minute" possible 
under Plaintiffs' theory of the case to effect service. 
Unfortunately, personal service upon the Defendant 
himself was NOT made and the Missouri sheriff had to 
leave the summons with Nikki Caldwell, the defendant's 
i 
wife! Unfortunately, that is not what Rule 4 AND Grant vs 
Lawrence require. The service must be effected at the 
place where the.Defendant is then living! That was Texas! 
The whole purpose for the Rule is obvious: to insure 
that THE DEFENDANT IN THE ACTION NOT SOMEONE ELSE 
gets the "summons" in a timely manner, ostensibly on the 
very day it was served! To allow (via the Court's 
"presumption") the default judgment to stand in the face 
of Defendant's assertions that his "usual place of abode" 
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was in Texas AND that he was unaware of this proceeding 
until the garnishment was effected upon him in September 
1996 flies in the face of that logic and policy! The 
Court must consider the realities of modern life in our 
transient society: people conveniently travel long 
distances, for extended period of time. [In the 
Defendant's own case, he travels from state-to-state, at 
jobs for his regular employer, performing environmental 
clean-up activities at contaminated sites.] In former 
times when the "usual place of abode" criterion was 
initially developed and when Grant vs Lawrence was 
decided people didn't move around much. They worked and 
then went home. They seldom travelled. Consequently, it 
was extremely likely that they would be made aware of 
service of process effected at "their usual place of 
abode" the very day that service was made! In today's 
world, that may not be the case. As the instant situation 
illustrates, the Defendant was living hundreds of miles 
away in Texas when the service was made in Missouri. 
In that context, it may be weeks before he returns to 
Missouri. In that period of time, the "summons" could be 
misplaced and/or inadvertently discarded and the 
Defendant might never know of the proceeding. Somebody 
Nikki, one of the children, a visitor, we don't know who-
--in Appleton may have discarded the "summons". We do 
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know that Mr Caldwell states, under oath, that he never 
received the summons or notification of the instant 
proceeding until the garnishment action in September 
1996! The Court's newly-adopted "presumption" rule now 
penalizes Mr Caldwell for conduct which is not his fault: 
for having employment out-of-state so that he doesn't 
actually spend every night in the dwelling where his 
family resides. Until now, it didn't matter; now, with 
the Court's enforcement contrary to the Grant vs 
Lawrence holding of the "presumption", he now is 
penalized! That's not right! [All that Mr Caldwell is 
asking for in this case is to have "his day in court" on 
the pleaded issues!] In these modern times, it is 
extremely illogical for the Court to now be abandoning 
or at least expanding the time-proven "usual place of 
abode" standard from Grant vs Lawrence! By so doing will 
only further engender more "default judgment" claims, 
appeals and controversy. 
Furthermore, the Court must consider the relative 
"equity" (or inequity, as the case actually is) in 
allowing certain defendants who were personally served-
--to have the "default judgments" against them set aside 
(ostensibly under a "discretion of the trial court" 
standard) and not allowing THIS DEFENDANT who WAS NOT 
PERSONALLY SERVED to set aside that default judgment. 
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We are talking under Plaintiffs' theory of the 
case and as pleaded here about the alleged "renewal" of 
an earlier "judgment". The Plaintiffs have waited the 
maximum amount of time to bring this matter to the 
attention of the Defendant, via the garnishment 
proceeding. The Plaintiffs will not, in that setting, be 
prejudiced by the delay which was entirely of their own 
choosing as far as the presentation of their theory of 
the case is concerned. If the courts trial or 
appellate have ever allowed a "default judgment" to be 
set aside in case where the defendant was actually, 
personally served, then this Court MUST, for equity 
reasons, allow THIS default judgment to be set aside 
because the defendant was NOT personally served! 
B 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE COURT SHOULD REMAND 
THE CASE TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR A PROPER APPLICATION OF 
THE NEWLY-ANNOUNCED "PRESUMPTION" STANDARD 
In the alternative, this Court should remand this 
case back to the District Court for application of the 
Court's newly-announced "presumption" standard, including 
specific findings following an evidentiary hearing. 
II 
THE COURT'S DECISION IGNORES THE DEFENDANT'S 
ANALYSIS OF THE RULE 54(c) (2) VIOLATIONS AND ISSUES 
The Court's opinion asserts [p. 2 thereof] that the 
Appellant [Mr Caldwell] has not provided any "relevant 
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legal authority or . . . any helpful legal analysis 
supporting his arguments" for the assertion that the 
default judgment is defective, as being in violation of 
Rule 54(c)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The Appellant DID provide the Court with "legal 
authority": the provision of Rule 54(c) (2), itself! The 
application of those provisions were carefully and 
methodically albeit not extensively, because this is a 
simple situation analyzed and applied to the situation 
at hand, on pages 24 through 25 of the Appellant's 
original brief and on pages 8 through 10 of the Reply 
Brief. The Plaintiffs' non-compliance with the Rule is 
facially discerned and established by the Plaintiffs' own 
pleadings! To say that the Defendant did NOT provide this 
Court with legal "authority" or "analysis" is erroneous! 
The Rule itself and its clear provisions are the 
best "authority" possible! The Rule itself as the 
operative, original ("first-generation") text is all 
that is needed. An appellate court decision (a "case" or 
"case-law support") is not for every assertion of law. 
The original text of a constitution, statute, or 
validly-promulgated and long-standing rule of court can 
certainly be the "starting" and the "finishing" point of 
any given analysis, particularly when that original text 
is so clear, so unambiguous and so on point! 
ll 
In the face of such argument and "authority", the 
Court's decision says, implicitly, that Rule 54(c)(2) 
does NOT mean what it clearly says! The Court's decision, 
by ignoring the issue, implicitly upholds an "evolution" 
from complaint to judgment which Rule 54(c) (2) was 
expressly designed to prevent! The Court's decision must 
expressly resolve this issue! 
Ill 
THE COURT'S DECISION IGNORES THE ISSUES 
RAISED BY THE STEVENS VS COLLARD DECISION 
The Court's decision totally ignores the standard 
announced in Stevens vs Collard, 837 P. 2d 593 (Utah Court 
of Appeals 1992) : that "default" judgments must be 
legally valid, on their face, and that before entering 
such judgments the trial court must be satisfied of such 
validity! These issues were validly raised at the trial 
court level and have been preserved on appeal. These 
issues should be resolved by this Court. 
The default judgment is facially-flawed in several 
particulars: 
1. Nelda Wall was not a party to the original 
divorce proceeding from 1983! She has no 
standing to enforce the provisions of that 
divorce decree! [Only Plaintiff LAUREL CALDWELL 
has standing to enforce the original divorce 
"judgment".] That the original action was a 
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divorce action is obvious from the face of the 
Plaintiffs' pleadings: the pleading says so! 
[Paragraph 3] Judge Noel should have known that 
the "pay off the Hal Wall mortgage" provision 
was not a "judgment" enforceable by NELDA WALL, 
a stranger to the original divorce action! 
2. The provision in the 1983 divorce decree is 
NOT a "judgment" subject to "renewal" [the 
singularly-pleaded legal theory for Plaintiff 
NELDA WALL] . This was acknowledged by Judge 
Noel (of the trial court) and by Judge Billings 
of this Court! [It is incredible that this 
Court would "split hairs" and engage in 
microscopic scrutiny of the Appellant's 
affidavit (i.e. as to where he was living, his 
working schedule, and that he did NOT receive 
the summons) and the inferences to be derived 
therefrom all for the purposes of depriving 
him of "his day in court" and to then IGNORE 
this most basic legal issue! It's not fair; 
it's not right. And it's certainly not what 
Rule 54(c) (2) mandates or proscribes! 
3- The Plaintiff NELDA WALL was NOT the 
Personal Representative of the Hal Wall estate; 
she was not validly appointed and she simply 
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has no "standing" to bring (via the originally 
filed complaint) an action to enforce the 
"judgment" (sic) "in favor of the Estate of Hal 
Wall", even if she is the surviving spouse! 
Such should have been obvious to Judge Noel: 
from the face of the pleading itself and from 
the "judicial notice" available from the 
District Court's own records. [It is openly 
acknowledged as a FACT that there was NO 
probate proceeding filed in behalf of the 
Estate of Hal Wall in the Third District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County (or any other 
county)!] 
Under Collard, the default judgment should have 
never been signed or entered! That Judge Noel did not 
initially discern the foregoing facial defects in the 
proffered "default judgment" when such was first 
presented to him is perhaps understandable: trial court 
judges are undoubtedly very busy. Undoubtedly, trial 
judges rely upon the integrity, professional competence 
and compliance with the Rules by the counsel appearing 
before them. In that setting, the "judgment" was signed 
and entered! That does not excuse the Court of refusing 
to set aside when Rule 54(c)(2) is brought to its 
attention. For this Court to implicitly condone what has 
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been done by Dotn i'laintiiii.v counsel and by the trial 
court • i.en "his issue was carefuJ U/ pointed out to the 
appeu.n L r. . >._ .;, .•.;xp11 j^L - . . rne uourt' s decision 
must also expressly resolve these issues. 
'• \ ' '! ••• • K T 
The Court's decision substitutes a newly-fashioned 
"prp^" ••!•-: : ' ( " • • -""sol i s "i :es:i dence") t : :i : ep] ace 
and/or expand the time-proven criterion of "usual place 
of abode" as incorporated into Rule 4 and -: • rernrefF. • 
Lawrence vs Grant and more recently applied l.i. nt-^a vs 
Reed. Such an expansion is improvident. In these modern 
times, the Court si lould i lot be expanding the time-proven 
criterion; rather it should be holdinq to that time-
proven criterion. 
The entered (and now-approved) iudgment is facially 
of Collard have not been followed. The Court's opinion is 
Court, Hi i.i.s mandate to dispense justice and fairness to 
the parties before it, must address (and correctly re-
address) tl lese issues I 
Respectfully submitted this 25th day oi February, 
1998. / , y # 
^ . ^ ^ — 
Attorney for Appellant 
STEVEN D CALDWrTT. 
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